

aliquam, nominauerunt antiqui silogismum, siue sit sermo fixus in anima, siue exterior cum uoce.”<sup>5</sup>

The only question which remains is, given that *συλλογισμός* is ambiguous, how do we know that it means “conclusion” in the *Metaphysics* passage quoted at the outset?

Aristotle, in order to avoid Meno’s problem (Plato *Meno* 80D5–8), divides knowledge into actual and potential (*An. post.* 71a29 ff.). Potential knowledge is then said to be prior in the individual (*De an.* 431a1 ff.).<sup>6</sup> If a man knows *this x*, his knowledge is actual (*De an.* 417b29), but if he knows the universal (i.e., *All x are y*), his knowledge is potential and indefinite (*Metaph.* 13. 10. 1087a14 ff.). Hence, knowledge of the universal is prior to knowledge of *this x*. On the basis of these assumptions, Aristotle argues that, if one were to suppose that a given letter did not

have a common name (or a name in common with anything else), it would be unique (1086b16–33). In fact, it could not even be duplicated, since, in order to do so, we should have to *know* that the purported duplicate was really the *same*. To *know* that two things are the same, however, one must first know the universal which they have in common, and this would amount to knowing that they have a common name. This is impossible *ex hypothesi*, for it was assumed that the given letter did not have a common name. It is precisely this point that Aristotle makes in *Metaph.* 13. 10. 1086b32–37: one could not conclude anything about a particular without prior knowledge of the universal.

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5. Alfarabi, *Liber de scientiis*, Latin translation by Girardo da Cremona, ed. A. G. Palencia, (Madrid, 1932), p. 134. It is probable that Alfarabi did not recognize the use of the word for “syllogism” that we are discussing, even though his characterization is quite general.

6. The sequence of references given in this section could all have been drawn from either *An. post.* or *Metaph.*, where similar points are often made. The sections that appear were chosen only for the reader’s convenience.

### HOW TO FLATTER WOMEN: *P. OXY.* 2891

Three scanty fragments from a handbook that was famous in antiquity, Philaenis of Samos’ treatment of love and sex, *Περὶ ἀφροδισίων*,<sup>1</sup> were rescued recently by E. Lobel.<sup>2</sup> Fragment 3 instructs us how successfully to flatter different kinds of women. But there is a serious textual problem involved here. Lobel’s text reads:

- 3 μὲν, τὴν μὲν [  
ὥς ἰσόθεον [[. . .]  
5 οἶσαν, τὴν δὲ αἰσχροῦ  
ὥς ἐπαφρόδιτον, τ[ὴν  
δὲ πρεσβυτέραν ὥς .]  
8 ἀν φαιο[.]ωνεῖνα .]

Lobel comments on line 8: “No Greek word is recorded which is compounded with φαιο-. For this reason I venture to call attention to the theoretical possibility of Φαιο[v]ω-

νειναι, Favoninam, and hasten to append the objections that no such Latin form is attested, that nothing known to me about any meaning of Favonius would make a derivative of it relevant to a flattering way of referring to a middle-aged woman, and that it is hard to believe that a Greek author of the third (or an earlier) century would not find a suitable expression in his own language.” In view of Lobel’s own objections, I think his conjecture Φαιο[v]ωνεῖναι may safely be dismissed as highly unlikely.

Another attempt at solving the problem was made by R. Merkelbach,<sup>3</sup> who suggests the following reading in lines 7–8: ὥς [νέ]αν Φαιο[σ]ών εἶναι. According to Merkelbach, -αιο- should be Ionic orthography for -αν-, and Φανσών accusative of a proper name Φανσώ, meaning “die Lichtspenderin” (from

1. On which cf. P. Maas, s.v. “Philaenis,” *RE*, XIX (1938), 2122; and F. W. Walbank, *Historical Commentary on Polybius*, II (Oxford, 1967), 356 f., ad 12. 13. 1.

2. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XXXIX, edited with notes by E. Lobel (London, 1972), 2891, with a facsimile on P1. 1.

3. *ZPE*, IX (1972), 284.

φάω, φαύω) and implying “eine freundliche Göttin niederen Rangs . . . , eine gute Fee.” I think this conjecture too must be discarded as unlikely. For the assumed existence of a “good fairy Phausō” is as gratuitous as that of a Favonina (and besides, *ao* for *av* does not seem to be paralleled in a literary papyrus).

I think the solution is simpler than inventing nonexistent words. The fifth letter in line 8 need not be an omicron, but may well be a sigma, written with its right curve continued almost to a complete circle, because it was linked to *another* sigma. Two sigmas sometimes tend to be linked, either in the way in

which, for example, ἔσσεται is written in *P. Heidelb.* 4011. 6 (= *Iliad* 11. 824),<sup>4</sup> or simply as a lying figure 8.

Thus read in lines 6–8: τ[ῆν] δὲ πρεσβυτέραν ὡς μ[ί]αν<sup>5</sup> φασ[σ]ῶν εἶναι: “. . . to an ugly woman (say) that she is ‘fascinating’ (or ‘sexy’), and to a middle-aged one, that she is a ‘wild pigeon.’” The sexual overtone implied in the compliment “pigeon” needs no comment. And the embellishment “a wild pigeon” (φάσσα) proves that a climax was intended by the sophisticated Philaenis.<sup>6</sup>

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4. A facsimile of *P. Heidelb.* 4011 is to be found in R. Seider, *Paläographie der griechischen Papyri*, II (Stuttgart, 1970), Pap. 17 on Pl. 9.

5. μ[ί]αν: Lobel comments: “A dot off the line.” I think the best candidate for the dot is a μ: cf. the μ in μὲν (line 3) and in περί φύλημάτ[ων] (line 9).

6. φάσσα, “wood pigeon,” is a twin sister of περιστέρα,

“pigeon”; cf., e.g., Arist. *HA* 8. 3. 593a16: “The wood pigeon and the common pigeon are visible at all seasons.” What is more important, Artemidorus (*Onirocrit.* 2. 20, p. 137. 11 Pack) informs us that to see a wood pigeon in a dream means to see a harlot: φάσαι καὶ περιστερὰ γυναῖκας σημαίνουσι, φάσαι μὲν πάντως πορνικάς, περιστερὰ δὲ ἔσθ’ ὅτε οἰκοδεσποῖνας καὶ κοσμίαις.

### ΤΑ ΚΑΘ’ ΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΓΝΩΡΙΖΕΙΝ (EN 6. 1141b14–21)

οὐδ’ ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν  
καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν·  
πρακτικὴ γάρ, ἡ δὲ πράξις περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. διὸ καὶ  
ἐνιοὶ οὐκ εἰδότες ἐτέρων εἰδόντων πρακτικώτεροι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς  
ἄλλοις οἱ ἐμπειροὶ· εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὐπεπτα  
κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγι-  
ειαν, ἀλλ’ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθια κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινά ποιή-  
σει μᾶλλον [Bekker].

15

20

Someone reading this passage might be tempted to think, as for instance Hardie seems to, that the items designated by the occurrences of τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα in lines 15 and 16 are individual birds and that these birds are perceptible. Hardie writes of the example Aristotle gives here: “The thought of the fully informed moral agent could be expressed in two syllogisms: the first specifying chicken as light food and the second applying the prescription of chicken to the food in the larder with the aid of a perceptual premiss, this is chicken.”<sup>1</sup> But are these καθ’ ἕκαστα individual perceptible birds for Aristotle? Is each of them an individual bird, say, this or that chicken?

On the basis of our present text, the answer almost surely must be negative. Aristotle says that if someone were to know that light meats were digestible and healthful, but he did not know what kinds (ποιῶ) were light, he would not produce health, but whoever knew that bird meats were light and healthful rather would produce it. The question is not which perceptible individuals have light meat: if Aristotle had wanted to ask that, he would have written τίνων δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, not ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ. The question is rather what kinds are light. The answer to τίνων would have been that these birds have light meat (ὅτι τούτων τῶν ὀρνίθων κοῦφα); but in place

1. W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory* (Oxford, 1968), p. 243.